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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
C&Y CORP., a Utah corporation, : 
ROBERT A. CONDIE, an i 
individual, and JAMES YARTER, : 
an individual, : 
Plaintiff/Appellants• : 
vs. : 
GENERAL BIOMETRICS, INC., a J 
Delaware corporation; : 
VENTANA GROWTH FUND, a : 
California limited partner- : 
ship, and THOMAS GEPHART, j 
an individual, j 
Defendant/Appellees. : 
: Court of Appeals 
: No. 940340-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS AND RESPONSE TO 
CROSS-APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Although this is Appellants C&Y Corporation's, Robert A. 
Condie's and James Yarter's ("C&Y Corporation") Reply Brief, C&Y 
Corporation is entitled to restate the issues presented for review 
by the cross-appellants. 
1. Are the trial court's findings of fact that neither 
Robert A. Condie nor James Yarter took any actions which breached 
their fiduciary duties to General Biometrics, Inc. clearly 
erroneous? Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Southland 
Corp. v. Potter, 760 P.2d 320, 321 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
1 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 33, provides in 
pertinent part: 
Except in a first appeal of right in a 
criminal case, if the court determines that a 
motion made or appeal taken under these rules 
is either frivolous or for delay, it shall 
award just damages, which may include single 
or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or 
reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing 
party. The court may order that the damages 
be paid by the party or by the partyf s 
attorney. 
Utah R. App. Pro. 33(a). 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 40, provides in 
pertinent part: 
The signature of an attorney or a party 
constitutes a certificate that the attorney or 
the party has read the motion, brief, or other 
paper; that to the best of the attorney's or 
party's knowledge, information, and belief, 
formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well 
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing 
law or a good-faith argument for the exten-
sion, modification, or reversal of existing 
law; and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purposes, such as to harass or cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the 
cost of litigation. 
Utah R. App. Pro. 40(a). 
The remainder of Rules 33 and 40, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure are set forth in Exhibit A attached hereto. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
C&Y CORPORATION IS NOT REQUIRED 
TO MARTIAL THE EVIDENCE. 
The essence of General Biometrics', Thomas Gephart's and 
Ventana's (hereinafter collectively referred to as "General 
Biometrics") briefs is that C&Y Corporation's appeal should be 
2 
dismissed for failing to martial the evidence. However, C&Y 
Corporation is not required to martial the evidence in support of 
the trial court's finding of fact on whether the parties entered a 
contract because C&Y Corporation is not challenging the findings of 
fact. C&Y Corporation is not asserting here that the trial court 
entered erroneous findings of fact. What C&Y Corporation is 
challenging is the trial court's legal determination that the 
contract was not sufficiently definite because a meeting of the 
minds as to certain ancillary terms is required in order to have a 
binding agreement. Because C&Y Corporation is not challenging the 
trial court's findings of fact, there is no need to martial the 
evidence in support of those findings. 
As this Court is well aware, the well-settled law in this 
state does not require that the parties have a meeting of the minds 
as to ancillary incidental matters. Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 
548 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). A contract is not required to provide 
for every collateral matter or possible contingency. Nixon & 
Nixon, Inc. v. John New & Assoc, Inc., 641 P.2d 144 (Utah 1982). 
Moreover, the interpretation of a writing or writings is a question 
of law. See Equitable Life and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 
1187 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Accordingly, because the trial court's 
findings of fact are not being challenged, the martialling of the 
evidence in support of those findings is not necessary. 
II. 
THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS 
SUFFICIENTLY DEFINITE TO CONSTITUTE A CONTRACT. 
The agreement between C&Y Corporation and General 
Biometrics is sufficiently definite to constitute a binding 
3 
contract because the parties agreed to the essential terms.* The 
January 7th and 10th letters contain the sales price, the terms of 
payment and what was to be sold. The purchase price was $500,000, 
with $400,000 to be paid upon closing, $75,000 within 90 days and 
$25,000 within 120 days. The item to be purchased was the MRC 
Division located in Bountiful, Utah, which included both the assets 
and liabilities of that division. The law is clear that courts 
favor the determination that an agreement is sufficiently definite. 
Application of Sing Chong Company, Ltd., 617 P.2d 578 (Haw. Ct. 
App. 1980).2 
Despite General Biometrics1 assertion that there was no 
meeting of the minds as to what was to be purchased and sold, there 
is no real question that it contained the assets and liabilities. 
Just because one party asserts that certain terms are ambiguous 
1
 General Biometrics points out well one thing in its brief. 
That one thing is that if the Court does not find that there is a 
sufficiently definite contract, then the inquiry stops there and 
this Court need not go any further. If there is no contract, then 
issues of authority to enter the contract, what constitutes a cash 
offer, etc., become moot. In a similar vein, the Court does not 
need to address both of the issues of whether C&Y Corporation's 
offer was a cash offer and whether Gephart had the apparent 
authority to enter the contract. If the Court concludes that C&Y 
Corporation made a cash offer of $500,000, then the offer would 
fall under the Board of Director's prior approval. Conversely, if 
the Court concludes that Gephart had the apparent authority to bind 
General Biometrics to the purchase and sale of the MRC Division, 
then the issue of whether the offer was a cash offer is irrelevant. 
2
 In spite of General Biometrics' contention to the contrary, 
the rule set forth in Application of Sing Chong does not mean that 
the rule does not come into play until after the courts find that 
an agreement is reached. It means that in determining whether an 
agreement is reached, the courts will favor the determination that 
the agreement was reached. However, General Biometrics1 reading of 
this Rule would nullify the effect of this rule of construction. 
Basically, General Biometrics1 reading is that if a contract is 
definite, then the courts favor a determination that it is 
definite. That simply does not make sense. 
4 
does not mean that those terms are ambiguous. Equitable Life & 
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). Although Mr. Condie's January 7th letter states only 
"assets," that is a term of art in the industry which means an 
asset purchase. In an asset purchase, both the assets and 
liabilities are purchased, as opposed to a stock purchase wherein 
stock is purchased. Mr. Brough, who was an expert witness, 
testified as follows: 
Q From an accountant's point of view, 
is sale of assets different than the sale of 
assets and liabilities? 
A No. 
Q It's not any different? 
A Not in my judgment, no. 
Q Do accountants distinguish from 
assets and liabilities on balance sheets? 
A Yes. 
Q And yet you consider assets and 
liabilities to be fungible terms. Is that 
correct? 
A I think what we're getting confused 
with a generic term of ways businesses are 
bought out. I'll tell you honestly the way 
this looks to me, when accountants talk about 
different ways. 
* * * 
Q That's my next — I believe you are 
referring to the difference about assets and 
liabilities. 
A Yes. 
Q And what is that? 
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A Well, accountants and business 
people in general talk about two ways to buy 
companies. One is a stock purchase and the 
other is asset purchase. And it's very common 
for people to say/ is this a stock or asset 
purchase. And 1 think that reading 
Mr. Condie's letter and also that really the 
first time it's talking about in a general 
sense, we're making an asset purchase here. 
And it's common in asset purchases for 
liabilities to kind of attach and come with 
them as opposed to say a stock purchase where 
you are buying different assets which is the 
underlying stock of a company. That's not the 
indication here. 1 think we're talking about 
a kind of generic reference to asset purchase 
here and certainly there is a difference 
between assets and liability. But 1 don't 
want to get it confused with what I think that 
letter says. 
Trial Transcript, June 4, 1994, pp. 150 and 164-65 (emphasis 
added)• 
In addition, Mr. Gephart sent the January 10th letter, 
which stated "assets and liabilities," to Mr. Condie after a 
telephone conversation in response to Mr. Condie's January 7th 
letter. During that telephone conversation, there is no question 
that what was being purchased was the assets and liabilities of the 
MRC Division. Mr. Gephart's January 10th letter is nothing more 
than a confirmation of that telephone conversation and a 
confirmation of their agreement. Mr. Condie testified as follows: 
Q (BY MR. MOXLEY): I would like to 
refer you to that letter, and in particular 
the first paragraph. What was your 
understanding of his response to your offer? 
A Well, should I read it? 
Q Yes. 
A "Pursuant to your January 7 
correspondence and our telephone conversation 
yesterday afternoon, I would like to provide a 
written acknowledgement of the agreement 
regarding the sales of assets and liabilities 
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of MRC from GenBio for $500,000. As I 
mentioned,, we generally agree with your propo-
sal." 
Q what
 w a s y Q u r understanding of the 
statement "we generally agree with your 
proposal"? 
A. well, it's obvious that we generally 
agree. However, the second paragraph states 
that I had an error and he says, please note, 
however, and he corrected what we had 
corrected on the phone. And I'll just read 
it. "Section b, section c and section d of 
your proposal only it seems to me $450,000. 
In this regard I would like to modify section 
b to be increased to $400,000 instead of 
$350,000 which is what we had discussed the 
prior day. So that the total will add up to 
the entire $500,000. I plan to take this 
proposal to the General Biometrics board of 
directors withiii the next week to receive 
formal approval." 
Q j ^ ^ y Q U h a v e a n y d i S C U S S i o n with Mr. 
Gephart about this letter after you received 
• it? 
A No, id not. 
Q And what 
to the transaction'; 
A in our second conversation where we 
talked and had an agreement on the price, 
Mr. Gephart asked me if I would have the 
legal work done because Mr. Flodin was busy 
and they were anxious to close the deal. And 
it would go much faster if we had our 
attorneys do the documentation of the deal. 
He also indicated that I should from that time 
forward deal with Mr. Flodin, who I knew. 
Trial Transcript, Jn ine 3, 11 99 i, pp 104-05 (emphasis added). 
Mr. Yarter testified bhat what "was being purchased was 
=i si lee I: coi i ta assets 
ai id liabilities. See, e.g., Trial Exhibit 1 4 (a ttached hereto as 
Exhibit "B"). Mr. Yarter testified as follows: 
A Well, basically, this is a total 
separate balance sheet from the total company. 
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It's just for the MRC division. And the sales 
or p and 1 statement is a p and 1 statement 
that just states the sales of the MRC 
division. It doesn't state the sales of the 
I-dot or the GenBio part of it. So these are 
all p and 1 statements in the balance sheet 
total which relate to MRC division. 
Q And by examining exhibits 13 and 14, 
can you ascertain what assets and liabilities 
are associated with the MRC division as 
opposed to General Biometrics? 
A Yes. 
Trial Transcript, June 2, 1993, p. 86 (emphasis added). 
Mr. Gephartfs January 10th letter did not provide any 
modification of the agreement, simply a correction in Mr. Condie's 
addition. The correction was agreed to in the telephone 
conversation between Mr. Condie and Mr. Gephart. Mr. Gephart's 
January 10th letter is the final word as to the sales price, terms 
of payment and what was to be purchased. Those are the essential 
terms of the agreement. Both Mr. Condie and Mr. Yarter agreed to 
those essential terms. Mr. Gephart agreed to those essential 
terms. There is absolutely no dispute as to the sales price, the 
terms of payment or what was to be purchased. 
Furthermore, because the Court ruled on a Rule 41 motion 
at the end of C&Y Corporation's case, any testimony from 
Mr. Gephart on the issue of what was meant by "assets" is not to be 
considered. But even if Mr. Gephart's testimony is to be 
considered, the trial court expressly found that it had "serious 
reservations on the credibility of Mr. Gephart's testimony." 
Ruling on Proposed Findings and Objections, IF 9 (R. 1593). 
Mr. Gephart's testimony, therefore, would be of minimal assistance. 
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The requirement of board approval also does not offend 
11ll i IJIIPI Il n i 11; iit'!"'>' nil II Hi i I 'v i ni ' i Il I Hi i" nil jr nt-Miicnl hoc m i s i Il iinrd 
approval was agreement. At best, a 
precondition to the formation contract as Mr. Condie 
testifier uuaiu approval was nothing more thar perfunctory 
matter because the l i. nateve t 
told them Trial 00-02. 
Moreover, because of the «r*i approval November 1989, of 
* s 
knew that additional board approva ] \ >« as :i: 10 1: necessary • The Board 
already had pre-approved the sale of the MRC Division for $500,000 
< ). 
As set forth *« r c v Corporationf<= tyrincipa^ Briet, this 
case is strikingly simila « * Rand-Whitney Packaging 
Cor p. _y , Robertson Grou^t _v« ' 1986). 
But this case is very df>"' southland loxp ru L t ei: > 60 
P.2d 320 (Utah Ct App "he Southland Corp. case, the 
letter agreements between the r^r+jps m^ie ^^ ,*t-p y -o mention of 
1 I HI I II 1,11 lll ' j t I " I I II I I II II II II ( i m t t l l i t ?l 1 L I l l ' l j l f i ll I I ( i l l , III 111 II 
even mentioned for the undefined rights claimed by Southland 
the court found, |, I:]he documents and the testimony demonstrate 
'. e.iTt", eiiii=!!iti S o u t h l a n d c l a i m s . 
The minds of the parties did not meet thliii property interest. . 
! I ::  • purchase price is mentioned for the undefined rights. The 
language is vague, inconsistent, ambiguous, and incomplete." Id. 
< • 
In the present case, the language of the contract is not 
vague or ambiguous. The price is mentioned, the terms of the sale 
9 
are mentioned, and the item to be purchased is mentioned. The 
situation in Southland Corp, is very different from the present 
case. Despite General Biometrics1 hopeful imagination, there is 
absolutely no similarity between the present case and the Southland 
Corp. case. 
But the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law 
that a meeting of the minds on certain ancillary terms was 
necessary in order for there to be a binding agreement. Even if 
there was no meeting of the minds on these ancillary items such as 
employee benefits, non-competition provision, etc., that is not 
required in order to have a binding contract. That is not the law 
in Utah. The well-settled law in this state is that if an 
agreement is reached on the essential terms, a binding, enforceable 
contract is created, despite the existence of ancillary incidental 
matters that are not specifically addressed or concluded in the 
agreement. Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
A contract is not required to provide for every collateral matter 
or possible contingency. Nixon & Nixon, Inc. v. John New & Assoc, 
Inc., 641 P.2d 144 (Utah 1982). 
In the present case, the essential terms of the agreement 
are the purchase price, the terms of payment and what is being 
sold. All of those terms were agreed to by the parties, as 
evidenced by the January 7th and January 10th letters. Items such 
as the noncompetition provision, employee benefits, etc. are not 
essential terms of the agreement. Those items were not the primary 
object of the agreement. Accordingly, because the essential terms 
of the., agreement were agreed to by the parties, the trial court 
erred in ruling that there was no agreement. This Court, 
10 
therefore, should reverse the trial court and rule that there was 
a sufficiently definite contract -w^ii the parties for the 
1 
III. 
THE SUBJECT CONTRACT FALLS WITHIN THE GENERAL BIOMETRICS 
BOARD'S PRIOR APPROVAL BECAUSE IT IS ft CASH OFFER. 
C&Y Corporation's offer of $500,000 cash to purchase the 
MRC 0 0 00 cash pal d upon closing and the 
remaining $100, OOu w. 1 1:1: :i i n L-'il Il ' iaiJLb h lUlhii il IIIIU . , 1 
Biometrics Board's prior approval because i t constituted 
offer However, the ial court , holding that this was 
H I I llHI 
side, the Court shoult * >< i u^e aa=> <* matter 
of ld.> orporatio. .« • :«. constituted a cash offer." 
I supports this 
ruling. The testimon * _, .o*Ksrui Biometrics wanted 
cash, and not stock in another company n n i^et exchange with 
another company, because needed the influx ~* ^h lid in the 
development of immunodot produc t i; i I: i :l cl: i 
General Biometrics. (R.1596) Nowhere In the record is there any 
testimony that a hold back $100,000 the purchase price for 
than cash otherwise did not within the prior board 
approval ; testimony was that the board approved the sale 
c: $500,000 in .Il Illifit is exactly what C&Y 
Corporation offered and what General Biometrics accepted. T'llhp, 
holding back of $100,000 for a total of 120 days does not alter the 
natur i , C&.Y Corporation was offering cash. 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that 
C&Y Corporation's offer was not a cash offer. Therefore, the Court 
should reverse the trial court and rule that C&Y Corporation made 
a cash offer which fell within the board of director's prior 
approval. 
IV. 
GEPHART HAD THE APPARENT AUTHORITY TO BIND GENERAL 
BIOMETRICS TO THE PURCHASE AND SALE OF THE MRC DIVISION. 
Based upon the findings of fact entered by the trial 
court, the trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that 
Gephart did not have the apparent authority to bind General 
Biometrics to the purchase and sale of the MRC Division. Even 
though certain actions may ultimately have been approved by the 
board of directors, it was not done until after Mr. Gephart or 
Mr. Townsen had given their approval to the transaction and 
permitted the board to approve such action. The board of directors 
simply would rubber stamp Mr. Gephartfs decisions. That is true in 
regard to the transfer of funds to the Darox Corporation, financing 
obtained from the Swedish investors and the firing of Mr. Monson, 
who was General Biometrics1 President. See Trial Transcript, 
June 2, 1994, pp. 117-18, 140 and 242. 
General Biometrics acquiesced in, and even invited, 
Mr. Gephart's and Mr. Townsen's control of its corporate affairs. 
As the trial court specifically found, both Mr. Gephart and 
Mr. Townsen had a great deal of control in the corporate decisions 
affecting General Biometrics. (R.1593). Those findings of fact 
are set forth on pages 19 through 21 of C&Y Corporation's opening 
Brief. If General Biometrics did not acquiesce in or invite 
12 
Mr. Gephart's and Mr. Il" , -jftn's control , II could * prevented 
these persons from treating General Biometrics their own 
corporation J, : 
and MI Townsen from acting and appointi; _, *-*• directors. 
(R.1593). When Mr. dy was ^'^ed as president of the company, 
Genera Gephart,' 
rather than Mr. w f General Biometrics. 
(R.1593). General Biometrics directors also could 
h senior officers, but 
instead chose acquiesce iepharr' 
The General Biometrics b directors also could have made 
decisions regarding whe~ recall loar a \ming of 
payments. ins * i ILK iax • ill • ::  .f 
directors acquiesced in Mr. Gephart making these decisions in the 
best interest Ventana, Gephart's venture capital firm, rather 
t " s 
a classic situatioi apparent authority corporation 
has acquiesced in and even invited the authority and control of 
c 
In addition, Mr. Condie and Mr. Yarter did act in good 
faith and reasonably relied upon Mr. Gephart's assertion of 
authority. In rulin - Corpora- i • rial in of negligent 
misrepresei i . • if li (ill I  ,< t 
Mr. Condie fs reliance on Mr, Gephart's assertion of control over 
General Biometrics and his authority to bind General Biometrics to 
13 
the subject contract was reasonable.3 The Court ruled as follows: 
As to the negligent misrepresentation 
standard, the plaintiffs have cited to the 
Court Jardine versus Brunswick Corporation, 
423 P. 2d 659, 1967. It establishes a 
standard. It says, "where one having 
pecuniary interest in a transaction is in a 
superior position to know facts and carelessly 
or negligently makes a false representation 
concerning them expecting the other party to 
rely on and act on, and the other party 
reasonably does so and suffers a loss in that 
transaction, the representor can be held 
responsible if the other elements of fraud are 
also present." . . . Based on the evidence, 
and I think there is not a great deal of 
evidence in this area as to the negligent 
misrepresentation, I think it is based 
primarily on Mr. Condie's testimony as to the 
representations of Mr. Gephart. But the 
evidence does establish that there was a 
representation that Mr. Gephart had the 
authority to sell GenBio. That the board 
approval would be—there would be no 
difficulty in obtaining board approval. Then 
the evidence does establish at this point that 
Mr. Condie relied on that representation in 
going forward and in the preparation of 
documents. Mr. Yarter also testified that he 
relied on it in liquidating approximately 
$200,000 worth of assets in providing legal 
fees for the sale of the corporation. Based 
on that and based on the evidence that is 
currently before the Court, the Court finds 
that there has been a prima facie case 
established as to negligent misrepresentation, 
and therefore, would deny the Rule 41(b) 
Motion as to that claim. 
Trial Transcript, June 9th, pp. 18-19 (emphasis added). 
General Biometrics conveniently ignores this express finding by the 
trial court. The reason the trial court found that Mr. Condie and 
Mr. Yarter reasonably relied upon Mr. Gephart's representations was 
because they had witnessed first-hand the exercise and control 
3
 The trial court ruled in favor of Defendants on C&Y 
Corporation's claim of negligent misrepresentation because it found 
that Mr. Gephart's representation was not of a presently existing 
fact. 
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which I !r Gephart exerted ove: Biometrics and General 
Biometrics1 acquiescence year 
perioc" \s former directors of General Biometrics, both Mr. Condie 
and M? -*-*•• knew of Mr. Gephart's control ability 
1 J 
Division u finding of reliance slams shut any 
argument made by General Biometrics that: Mr. Condie fs and 
f In1 , ' ii-i i 1 1 ' » i " i " ! in mi I i 11 i n e l 1 i iiiiii11!! i i ' i r I r e a s o n a b l e . 
Because General Biometrics acquiesced in, and even 
invited, Mr. Gephart control of corporate affairs, and 
because Condie «*-t-or r^asonab! elied upon 
I l:i: Gephax \ tpparen 
purchase and sale of the MRC Division, Gephart «ve ..**. 
apparent authority to do "herefore, this Court should reverse 
l l r h I I I IF rif Ip r l i P I I I (111 I I H I ! 1 I \i I ( I 
bind General B iometr ic s tu • chast? ami s a l e o t \hv fill ML" 
D i v i s i o n . 
V. 
T H E T R I A L COURTfS FINDINGS OF ti 
ARE FATALLY INCONSISTENT. 
As 
trial court' finding.* t i ratai.y ;;consistent and must be 
set aside by this Cour estopped from 
contrary blatant misrepresentation o f record General 
Biometricsf citation record quotation is misquoted, 
misrepresented c 01 context. 
The statement quoted by General Biometrics that the 
proposed findings had "nothing to do with Plaintiffs' alter-ego 
argument" has absolutely nothing to do with the findings of fact on 
apparent authority. This statement was made in regard to only one 
proposed finding of fact, not all of the findings of fact as 
General Biometrics states. In addition, "alter-ego" is not 
synonymous with apparent authority. What "alter-ego" refers to is 
an entirely separate cause of action asserted in C&Y Corporation's 
Complaint. (R. 11-13) 
In General Biometrics' Objections to C&Y Corporation's 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, General 
Biometrics objected to C&Y Corporation's proposed Finding of Fact 
No. 4 as follows: 
Fact No. 4 is not relevant to the issue of 
whether Yarter and Condie breached their 
fiduciary duty to GenBio especially in light 
of the court's ruling that there is no unity 
of interest or authority of control between 
Ventana and GenBio. Fact No. 4 only has 
relevance to Plaintiffs' alter-ego argument on 
which this Court specifically declined to 
rule. See Transcript of Court's Ruling of 
June 9, 1993, at 19. 
(R. 1406) (emphasis added). In response to that objection, C&Y 
Corporation stated that "Proposed Finding of Fact No. 4 had nothing 
to do with Plaintiffs' alter-ego argument . . . ." (R. 1532). 
There is absolutely no mention of apparent authority anywhere in 
General Biometrics' objection or in C&Y Corporation's response to 
that objection. As referenced by General Biometrics in its 
objection to the proposed finding of fact to the Court's Ruling of 
June 9, 1993, the Court refrained from ruling on the alter-ego 
cause of action holding that the issue had become moot in this case 
16 
because -ound ttiat there was underlying contract. See 
J Transci: :i p I: pp 
General Biometrics has misrepresented ^ this Court that 
the statement made in relation to the entirely separate alter ego 
claim has any bearing on the lusue of apparent authority. Alter 
ego'an i, I apparent y luvi" .ibsuJ till* I y 1111 IMI.II I oiiMlvi f In I his 
setting. Accordingly, because of the complete inconsistency in the 
trial court's findings of fact, this Court should remand this case 
f n i i ii 1 L""hn 111 I 11 I! I ' ' \: 111 I 1 I n 1 in i l 1 111 I  1  • I  I  11I l U e p l i r t i t I  in 1 I h e 
apparent authority oind General Biometrics to the purchase and 
sale of the MRC Division. 
VI. 
NEITHER MR. CONDIE NOR MR. YARTER BREACHED 
THEIR FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO GENERAL BIOMETRICS. 
Although Genex a ] Biome tr i cs 1 las accused C& iill! Cor p ::)i: a I:::i c n 
of reneging on its duty to martial the evidence, General Biometrics 
has done the very same thing J n challenging T'^ e trial court's 
i 1 siti: breached 
their fiduciary duties owed t General Biometrics. The difference 
between C&Y Corporation's appeal and General Biometrics' appeal is 
1 irt made errors 
of lav General Biometrics challenging trial court's 
findings 1 1 ." : Ls a classic case of the pot calling the 
kettle black. 
The 1 t n i l mi Mill I 1' i 1 "i I s p i n j tut, t 1 m l i iiii |»i, t (<it:t I halt n e i t h e r 
Mr. Condie nor Mi: Yarter breached their fiduciary duties to 
General Biometrics. The Court expressly found that Mr. Condie and 
Hi Van lei I (ill I 1 J I pel Minii I iilui'l 111 y 1 I  111II in . 111 Il 1 1 ini i f e r r o d iiiiiiiy 
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benefits on General Biometrics. The Court made the following 
findings of fact: 
13. Although Mr. Condie was a director when 
he first contacted Mr. Townsen to make an 
offer to purchase the MRC Division, Mr. Condie 
specifically resigned from the board so that 
he could enter subsequent negotiations for 
purchase and sale of the MRC Division and 
consummate an agreement. 
14. Mr. Yarter resigned from the board prior 
to the time any offers for the purchase and 
sale of the MRC Division were made. 
15. Even after resigning from the board of 
directors in November 1990, Mr. Yarter 
introduced Dr. Preston Dorsett to GenBio for 
the purpose of Dr. Dorsett negotiating for the 
purchase and sale of the MRC Division. 
16. When Mr. Condie rented his condominium in 
Park City, Utah, to GenBio, there was a 
benefit to the corporation rather than an 
abuse of corporate authority. Three people 
were occupying the condominium for 
approximately $125 per week. 
17. The receipt by Mr. Condie of health 
insurance provided by GenBio was not an abuse 
of discretion and did not constitute an 
improper benefit. It appeared to be a custom 
and practice of this corporation to provide 
such benefits. 
18. Mr. Condie as a director regularly 
requested that shareholder meetings be held as 
required by the Bylaws. 
19. Other benefits also were provided to 
Board members, the Board Minutes of November 
30, 1989, show that the Board took action to 
provide Ventana a $2,000 per month consulting 
fee for prior service for approximately 8-15 
months based on the fact that Mr. Townsen had 
put in excess time prior to that period. 
20. The information Mr. Condie or Mr. Yarter 
obtained in making their decision to pursue 
the purchase of the MRC Division was not of a 
confidential nature and was the same 
information which had been sent to other 
potential purchasers. The information which 
Mr. Condie of [sic] Mr. Yarter received also 
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was-the same information sent to Dr. Dorsett. 
21. Prior to the time Mr. Condie and 
Mr. Yarter had any interest in purchasing the 
MRC Division/ the GenBio Board of Directors 
authorized the sale for $500,000 cash in 
November 1989. 
22. Information relating to the MRC Division, 
including financial information, was 
segregated for the express purpose of 
providing this information to prospective 
purchasers. 
23. In the November 30, 1989, board meeting, 
the Board of Directors gave Mr. Gordy approval 
to sell MRC for $500,000 or more and Mr. Gordy 
would receive a 5% commission for the sale of 
the MRC Division. Mr. Gephart and Mr. Townsen 
also gave their approval to sell the MRC 
Division prior to the November 30, 1989, 
meeting. 
24. Mr. Gordyfs testimony indicated that In 
regularly marketed the sale of MRC for a 6 to 
8 month period. 
34. The MRC Division clearly was for sale 
beginning in November of 1989. Prior approval 
of that sale also had been obtained from both 
Mr. Gephart and Mr. Townsen prior to it going 
to the Board of Directors for approval. 
35. The business opportunity and information 
regarding the potential of MRC had been 
available to GenBio and its officers, and 
particularly in this case, had been available 
to Mr. Gephart and Mr. Townsen. Mr. Gephart 
and Mr. Townsen had available to them the 
same knowledge and information that was avai-
lable to Mr. Condie and Mr. Yarter, 
36. Every six months, Mr. Gephart and Mr. 
Townsen performed a full evaluation of each of 
the business opportunities of the portfolio 
companies, including GenBio. 
37. The same information also was fully 
disclosed to Mr. Gephart and Mr. Townsen on at 
least a bi-monthly basis. 
I !:/( i ] Lna on Prooosec .ndinas ar Il 11 11. >«-1 m i n i III! Ill I  .1 "-I ijn ill "I'll I " 
in 
(R. 1594-97) (emphasis added). 
If General Biometrics wanted to challenge the sufficiency 
of these findings, then it must martial the evidence in support of 
these findings and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the findings. In Peterson v. Peterson, 818 
P.2d 1305 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), this Court held: 
We set aside findings of fact only when they 
are clearly erroneous. In making that 
determination, we give "due regard" to the 
"opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses." Utah R. Civ. 
P. 52(a). The finding is clearly erroneous 
when, "although there is evidence to support 
it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence 
is left with a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been committed." State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987) (quoting 
United States v. United States Gypsum Company, 
333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). In challenging 
findings, the appellant "must martial all 
evidence in favor of the facts as found by the 
trial court and then demonstrate that even 
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the court below, the evidence is 
insufficient to support the findings of fact. 
If the appellant fails to martial the 
evidence, the appellate court assumes that the 
record supports the accuracy of the lower 
courtf s conclusions of law and application of 
that law in the case." 
Id. at 1307-08 (quoting Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 
1991)) (citations omitted). Because General Biometrics has failed 
to martial the evidence and then demonstrate that the evidence is 
legally insufficient to support the findings, they have failed to 
meet their burden of showing that the findings of fact are clearly 
erroneous. Accordingly, this Court must deny General Biometries' 
claim for relief. Robb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). 
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Assuming arguendo that General Biometrics was not 
r e q u i r e d I mini I  I ill t h e P V I I I I M I M II I I i II i ill II II i i II mi n i t l u - T 
Mr. Condie nor Mr farter breached their fiduciary duties. Even 
though Mr. Condie and Mr. Yarter may have conceived of their plan 
to purchase the MRC Division while they were still directors, there 
is nothing improper about that. As tl le Court specifically found, 
the MRC Division clearly was for sale prior to the time Mr. Condie 
and Mr. Yarter decided inquire into purchasing the MRC Division 
( lull d i n,ji(d,i„Ji \-. Il luli'i'iei »i l Bin >mel r .u ;s , 
including Mr. Gephart and Mr Townsen, were very much aware of all 
opportunities which were available to General Biometrics in regards 
t ex 
obtained any confidential information regarding the MRC Division. 
(R.1595). Moreover, the Court specifically found that as soon as 
Mr. Condie made an offer to purchase the MRC Division to a 
disinterested person, he resigned from the Board of Directors so as 
to avoid any potential conflict of interest. (R.1594). Mr. Yarter 
previously had resigned from the Board of Directors prior to making 
t h e o t t e i I n i HI in L'l i i i »t» th in HN< I I I ' i . i in I II I  ' i" I 4 l l l p i m I I I I . I IH nitf t h e 
offer purchase the MRC Division, both Mr. Gephart and Mr. 
Townsen knew very well who was attempting the purchase. They both 
k n e w t h i i i t t Ii P o n d i i? nn t I II Ill , m r t e r WH I: IJI" i inn no II v e i l hie • •• 1 
Biometrics has failed 1 martial the evidence and has made 
absolutely no showing that either Mr. Condie or Mr. Yarter breached 
any of ttleli fiduciary duties to General Biometrics. 
In addd t::i or i, Gex iera] Biometrics is incorrect in its 
assertion that the trial court found there was no breach of 
fiduciary duty because the contract never was consummated. The 
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comment made by the Judge Memmott that there has been no harm to 
General Biometrics because Mr. Condie's and Mr. Yarter's attempt to 
purchase the MRC Division was unsuccessful merely was made in 
passing. The trial court did not in any manner rely on this 
supposed conclusion of law in making its ruling that neither 
Mr. Condie nor Mr. Yarter breached their fiduciary duties. In the 
trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law regarding 
General Biometrics1 claim that Mr. Condie and Mr. Yarter breached 
their fiduciary duties, absolutely no statement is made that 
because the deal was not ultimately consummated, there could not 
have been any breach of fiduciary duties. General Biometrics has 
made another misrepresentation to this Court. When read in 
context, that statement by Judge Memmott merely was meant to 
suggest that General Biometrics likely suffered no damages, even 
assuming a breach of fiduciary duty, because the contract never was 
performed. Again, the Court should not condone such conduct by 
General Biometries' counsel and should affirm the trial court's 
finding that neither Mr. Condie nor Mr. Yarter breached any of 
their fiduciary duties to General Biometrics. 
VII. 
GENERAL BIOMETRICS IS NOT ENTITLED TO ITS COSTS AND 
ATTORNEYS FEES INCURRED AS A RESULT OF DEFENDING THIS APPEAL. 
General Biometrics is not entitled to its costs and 
attorneys fees incurred in defending this Appeal pursuant to 
Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, because C&Y 
Corporation's Appeal has a reasonable legal and factual basis. 
Although Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides for 
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an award of attorney fees, such an award is permitted only if the 
appeal has 
In Backstrom Family Ltd* Partnership v. Hallf ' *d 
1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), this Court stated that under Rule 33, 
Utah Rules < r Appellate Procedure, frivolous appeal is one 
wi" e a s o n a u 1.1,-" Jeyall! r r I! d c l u a l !.>*.: is i le l ,i iieij i iii U lit ruin n ' t . 
App. 40(a)." Id. at 1160. Rule 40(a) states: 
The signature of ai i attorney or a par ty 
constitutes a certificate that the attorney or 
the party has read the motion, brief, or other 
paper; that to the best of the attorney's or 
party's knowledge, information, and belief, 
formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well 
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing 
law or a good-faith argument for the exten-
sion, modification, or reversal of existing 
law; and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purposes, such as to harass or cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the 
cost of litigation. 
Utah R. App. Pro. 40(a). Rule 40(a) simply requires that an appeal 
the purpose of delay. Moreover, "sanctions for frivolous appeals 
should only applied in egregious cases, lest there be an 
i mproper < til: :i,e i: ::l g l :i Ill:: to appea Il err oneous .31 ower coi lr I: 
decisions." Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 389 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(emphasis added). See also Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 162 
(Utah Li. 1989). 
• • ' A * -.*••» l u i I I in ilii in I /«V I I J i p * u ii I tn in in"" i i i p e n I m y h i i e . l d i n I liiiiii 
this brief, C&Y Corporation's appeal is i* ell grounded in fact or 
law and is .. : brought for the purpose ot delay The trxal court 
in in ii-in it-,1 i iiuiine ill in mi i ,1 in mi n ' * u e s s ± t a t e d 
appeal, A t: the very least, this certainly JLS not an egregious case 
in which an appeal has no basis In fact or law. Accordingly, this 
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Court should deny General Biometries' claim for attorneys' fees and 
costs pursuant to Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated in C&Y Corporation's opening 
brief, and for the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs/appellants 
respectfully request that this Court: 
1. Reverse the trial court's determination that C&Y 
Corporation's offer of $500,000 cash to purchase the MRC Division, 
with $400,000 cash down and the remainder within 120 days, did not 
constitute a cash offer, and rule as a matter of law that C&Y 
Corporation's offer was a cash offer; 
2. Reverse the trial court' s determination that Gephart 
did not have the apparent authority to enter the subject contract, 
and direct the trial court to enter its conclusion of law that 
Gephart did have the apparent authority to bind General Biometrics 
to the subject contract for the purchase and sale of the MRC 
Division; 
3. Reverse the trial court's determination that the 
agreement between the parties was not sufficiently definite to 
constitute a contract, and direct the trial court to enter its 
conclusion of law that the parties had agreed to the essential 
terms and that the agreement was sufficiently definite to 
constitute a contract; 
4. Set aside the trial court's judgment and remand the 
case for a new trial if the Court does not find that Gephart had 
the apparent authority to enter the subject contract; 
5. Affirm the trial court's finding of fact that 
neither Robert Condie nor James Yarter breached any duty which they 
24 
may have owed to General Biometrics; 
6. -Deny GeneiaJ BlomeL ies 
under Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 11th day of October 1994. 
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Tab A 
Rule D a m a g e s for de lay < 11 111 v 1111i1 m • i A \ i111 . m I  H I I» I i > i \ 
of attorney's fees . 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of 
right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal 
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just 
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, 
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order 
that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, 
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for 
the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to 
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will 
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
(c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its 
own motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of 
the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of 
the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other 
paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court 
shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show 
cause why such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause 
shall set forth the allegations which form the basis of the damages and 
permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for 
good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of 
oral argument. 
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the 
court shall grant a hearing. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 33 is 
substantially redrafted to provide definitions 
and procedures for assessing penalties for de-
lays and frivolous appeals. 
If an appeal is found to be frivolous, the court 
must award damages. This is in keeping with 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
However, the amount of damages — single or 
double costs or attorney fees or both — is left to 
the discretion of the court. Rule 33 is amended 
to make express the authority of the court to 
ANALYSIS 
Frivolous appeal. 
—Defined. 
—Sanctions. 
Cited. 
Frivolous appeal. 
A husband's appeal from a judgment relat-
ing to alimony and distribution of marital 
property was frivolous, where there was no ba-
sis for the argument presented and the evi-
dence and law was mischaracterized and mis-
stated. Eames v Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah 
1987). 
Plaintiff's counsel violated rule and was 
therefore subject to sanction when, after he in-
vestigated plaintiff's malpractice action 
against defendant orthodontist and found that 
he could not prove breach of duty or causation, 
impose sanctions upon the party or upon coun-
sel for the party. This rule does not apply to a 
first appeal of right in a criminal case to avoid 
the conflict created for appointed counsel by 
Anders v. California. 386 US 738 (1967) and 
State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981?. 
Under the law of these cases, appointed coun-
sel must file an appeal and brief if requested by 
the defendant, and the court must find the ap-
peal to be frivolous in order to dismiss the ap-
peal. 
the record was devoid of any relevant, admissi-
ble evidence showing negligence, and after los-
ing on summary judgment, he persisted in fil-
ing an appeal. Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 41-1 
(Utan 1990). 
An appeal brought from an action that was 
properly determined to be in bad faith is neces-
sarily frivolous under this rule. Utah Dep't of 
Social Servs v. Adams. 806 P.2d 1193 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). 
—Defined. 
For purposes of this rule, a frivolous" appeal 
is one having no reasonable legal or factual 
basis. Lack of good faith is not required. 
O'Brien v. Rush. 744 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). 
A frivolous appeal is one without reasonable 
legal or factual basis. Backstrom Family Ltd. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
4 1 / U I A f l H U L L O KJT A r r C b L i A H J i u u u u w w u u -„*..v. »v 
(c) Minute book. The clerk may keep a minute book, in which shall be 
entered a record of the daily proceedings of the court. The clerk shall prepare, 
under the direction of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or the Presiding 
Judge of the Court of Appeals, a calendar of cases awaiting argument. In 
placing cases on the calendar for argument, the clerk shall give preference to 
appeals in accordance with the priority of cases provided in Rule 29. 
(d) Notice of orders. Immediately upon the entry of an order or decision, 
the clerk shall serve a notice of entry by mail upon each party to the proceed-
ing, together with a copy of any opinion respecting the order or decision. 
Service on a party represented by counsel shall be made upon counsel. 
(e) Custody of records and papers. The clerk shall have custody of the 
records and papers of the court. The clerk shall not permit any original record 
or paper to be removed from the court, except as authorized by these rules or 
the orders or instructions of the court. Original papers transmitted as the 
record on appeal or review shall upon disposition of the case be returned to the 
court or agency from which they were received. The clerk shall preserve copies 
of briefs and attachments, as well as other printed papers filed. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- division (c) designation and heading and redes-
ment, effective October 1, 1992, added the Sub- ignated the following subdivisions accordingly. 
Rule 40. Attorney's or party's certificate; sanctions and 
discipline. 
(a) Attorney's or party's certificate. Every motion, brief, and other paper 
of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney 
of record who is an active member in good standing of the Bar of this state. 
The attorney shall sign his or her individual name and give his or her busi-
ness address, telephone number, and Utah State Bar number. A party who is 
not represented by an attorney shall sign any motion, brief, or other paper 
and state the party's address and telephone number. Except when otherwise 
specifically provided by rule or statute, motions, briefs, or other papers need 
not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The signature of an attorney or 
party constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party has read the motion, 
brief, or other paper; that to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and 
belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it is not frivolous or interposed for the 
purpose of delay as defined in Rule 33. If a motion, brief, or other paper is not 
signed as required by this rule, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly 
after the omission is called to the attention of the attorney or party. If a 
motion, brief, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the authority 
and the procedures of the court provided by Rule 33 shall apply. 
(b) Sanctions and discipline of attorneys and parties. The court may, 
after reasonable notice and an opportunity to show cause to the contrary, and 
upon hearing, if requested, take appropriate action against any attorney or 
person who practices before it for inadequate representation of a client, con-
duct unbecoming a member of the Bar or a person allowed to appear before the 
court, or for failure to comply with these rules or order of the court. Any action 
to suspend or disbar a member of the Utah State Bar shall be referred to the 
Ethics and Discipline Committee of the State Bar for proceedings in accor-
dance with the Rules of Discipline of the State Bar. 
(c) Rule does not affect contempt power. This rule shall not be con-
strued to limit or impair the court's inherent and statutory contempt powers. 
(d) Appearance of counsel pro hac vice. An attorney who is licensed to 
practice before the bar of another state or a foreign country but who is not a 
member of the Bar of this state, may appear, upon motion, pro hac vice. Such 
attorney shall associate with an active member in good standing of the Bar of 
this state and shall be subject to the provisions of this rule and all other rules 
of appellate procedure. 
TabB 
MICROBIOLOGICAL RESEARCH CORPORATION 
BALANCE SHEET 
September 30, 1990 
ASSETS 
urrent Assets 
Cash in Bank/ChecJcing/Utah 
Petty Cash 
Total Cash 
Accounts Receivable 
Allowance for Bad Debt 
Total Receivables 
Prepaid Rent 
Other Prepaid Expense 
Total Prepaid Expenses 
Raw Materials 
Work in Process 
Finished Goods 
Inventory 
Total Current Assets 
,-operty and Equipment 
Furniture and Fixtures 
Laboratory Equipment 
Leasehold Improvements 
Autos 
Total Property & Equipment 
Accum Deprec/Furniture/Fixture 
Accum Deprec/Lab Equipment 
Accum Deprec/Leasehold Imprvmt 
Accum Deprec/Autos 
Total Accumulated Depreciation 
Net Fixed Assets 
•her Assets 
Deposits 
3,783 
150 
134,442 
(2,000) 
2,825 
616 
46,195 
3,767 
53,734 
39,523 
158,922 
2,558 
8,840 
(32,887) 
(128,319) 
(497) 
•(8,840) 
3,933 
132,442 
3,441 
103,696 
243,512 
209,843 
(170,543) 
39,301 
298 
TOTAL ASSETS 
MICROBIOLOGICAL RESEARCH CORPORATION 
BALANCE SHEET 
September 30, 1990 
LIABILITIES AND EQUITY 
rrrent Liabilities 
Accounts Payable 
IntraCompany Payable 
Accrued Vacation Pay 
Total Accrued Eaployee Expense 
Accrued Sales & Use Tax - UT 
Current Portion Capital Lease 
Current Portion Long Term Debt 
Total Current Liabilities 
ng Term Liabilities 
$ 
7,419 
26,858 
(267,464) 
7,419 
107 
186 
2,201 
(230,693) 
ockholder Equity 
Current Earnings 
Net Stockholder Equity 
513,804 
513,804 
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND EQUITY 283 
GB0996 
MICROBIOLOGICAL RESEARCH CORPORATION 
INCOME STATEMENT 
September 30, 1990 
and for the Thirteen periods ended September 30, 1990 
YR TO DATE 
Sales 1,188,124 
Product Returns 0 
Discounts/Allowances (117,671) 
Net Sales 1,070,453 
Replacements (8,747) 
Standard Materials (70,682) 
Standard Labor (112,893) 
Standard Overhead (262,096) 
Cost of Sales at Standard (445,671) 
Gross Margin at Standard 616,036 
Material Usage Variance (14,707) 
Labor Efficiency Variance 14,078 
Mfg. Spending Variance 10,138 
Production Volume Variance 68,531 
Total Manufacturing Variances 78,040 
Gross Profit 694,076 
Sales Expense 0 
Marketing Expense (18,733) 
Administrative Expense: (123,830) 
Finance Expense: (36,849) 
Research & Development Costs: 0 
Total Operating Expense: (179,413) 
Operating Profit/ (Loss) 514,663 
Other Income/Expense (859) 
Net Income/Loss Before Taxes 513,804 
NET INCOME/LOSS 513,804 7 
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MICROBIOLOGICAL RESEARCH CORPORATION 
INCOME STATEMENT 
and for the Thirteen periods ended September 30, 1990 
Payroll/IFA Indirect toyroll Tax/IFA Indirect tefcl. Beneflta/IFA Indir CFA Outside Services 
[FA QC supplies 
QUALITY ASSURANCE 
Indirect 
8 
ons tlth  SVi p 
Allocations In/Out (47,434) 
YR TO DATE 
/ CONTROL 
22,635 
1 908 
812 
270 
159 
132 
21,519 
BUDGET 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Quality Control/Assurance Cost 
m 
v> 
o 
4> 
VARIANCE 
22,635 
1 908 
812 
270 
159 
132 
21,519 
(47,434) 
0 
MICROBIOLOGICAL RESEARCH CORPORATION 
INCOMB STATEMENT 
September 30, 1990 
and for the Thirteen periods ended September 30, 1990 
YR TO DATE BUDGET 
MARKETING 
Oil 4,627 0 
Oil Tax 917 0 
©yea Benefits 225 o 
lisions, 7,011 o I 
tage/Deliyery '285 0 
•pKohe/Teiefax 1,041 0 
reciatlon 102 o 
_ _cellaneoue 250 8,400 
Seaples 4^274 0_ 
Marketing Expense 18,733 8,400 
o 
o> 
»-• 
o 
o 
o 
VARIANCE 
4,627 
917 
225 
7,011 
285 
1,041 
102 (8,150) 
4i274 
10,333 
MICROBIOLOGICAL RESEARCH CORPORATION 
INCOME STATEMENT 
September 30, 1990 
and for the Thirteen periods ended September 30, 1990 
YR TO DATE BUDGET 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
H 65,404 71,200 Tax . 5,439 7,120 
oyee Benefits 3,180 5,040 
uter Supplies 113 o 
age/Auto 0 360 
•/Other 24 o gquipment ft Equip Rental 0 526
duipment Repair/Maintenance 0 1,200 gaintenanca/Buildlng/Grounda 0 600 
ffioe Supplies 21 3,600 
Rent . 0 7 656 
~ aephpne/Telex/Telef oic 217 2,040 
duties ' 0 i;920 
Jucation ft Ed. Materials 35 0 
'axes/Property 304 0 jepreciatlon 245 1,920 
Miscellaneous 440 3,600 
mm:"**" in 8 
Rations In/Out 48,ooo 
en 
a 
a 
48,000 
istrative Expense; 123,830 154,784 
VARIANCE 
24 (528, ( i : 2 0 0 Uoo 
3 ,579 k 7 ,656 
1 823 
1 920 
35 
304 
1,675) 
3 160) 
122 
288 
0 
(30^9547 
MICROBIOLOGICAL RESEARCH CORPORATION 
INCOME STATEMENT 
September 30, 1990 
and for the Thirteen periods ended September 30, 1990 
YR TO DATE BUDGET VARIANCE 
FINANCE 
rroll 31,485 33,450 (1.965) 
rroll Tax . 2.665 3,345 7680) 
iloyee Benefits (753) 960 (1,713 
:slie Services , 132 o 132 
futer Repair/Maintenance 90 0 90 
uter Supplies 103 0 103 
paent & Equip.Rental 0 528 (528) 
itenance/Biliiaing/Grounda 0 264 (264) 
Lee supplies 885 900 (15 
rwocage/Delivery 616 660 J44J 
s i S f ^ s s 7 ^ 1 * ^ 0 1 0 ^ 30! ?: 111 ft'iin I 
SSrJoh?!o; t t X f t f l / U C e n 8 e f l 1,24"? 1,24? , Ml 
'Late Fees 28 0 28 
CD 
CD 
•-» 
O 
O 
finance Expenses 36,849 48,519 (11,670) 
MICROBIOLOGICAL RESEARCH CORPORATION 
INCOME STATEMENT 
September 30, 1990 
and for the Thirteen periods ended September 30, 1990 
YR TO DATE BUDGET VARIANCE 
OTHER INCOME/EXPENSE 
Interest Expense 859 0 859 
Other Income/Expense (859) 0 859 
